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Abstract
An example of a quantum game is presented that explicitly shows the impact of entangle-
ment on the game-theoretical concept of evolutionary stability.
PACS: 03.67.a, 02.50.Le, 87.23.n
Keywords: Quantum Games, Entanglement, Evolutionary stability
1 Introduction
One of the major motivations in recent work on quantum games [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15] is to know how quantization of a game affects/changes the existence/location of a Nash
equilibrium (NE) [16]. Game theory [17] offers examples where, instead of a unique equilibrium,
multiple Nash equilibria emerge as the solutions of a game. In these examples selecting one (or
possibly more) from many equilibria requires a refinement of the NE concept. A refinement is
a rule/criterion that prefers some equilibria out of many. Numerous refinements are found in
game theory; examples include perfect equilibrium (used for extensive- and normal-form games),
sequential equilibrium (a fundamental non-cooperative solution concept for extensive-form games)
and correlated equilibrium (used for modelling communication among players).
From the view point of quantum games the notion of refinement of NE naturally motivates the
question how quantization of a game can affect a refinement; without affecting the corresponding
NE. That is, a NE persists1 in both the classical and quantum versions of a game but its refinement
does not. Games and quantization procedures offering such examples can be said to extend the
boundary of investigations in quantum games from existence/location of NE to existence/location
of one (or more) of its refinements – in relation to quantization of the game. Present paper offers
such an example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) discusses the concept of evolutionary
stability and why is can be discussed in quantum games. In Section (3) an example is presented
that shows explicitly the role of entanglement in deciding evolutionary stability of a strategy. For
comparison a separate subsection discusses the classical case. Section (4) discusses results and
indicates lines of further investigation.
2 Evolutionary stability
The concept of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) [18, 19] is the cornerstone of evolution-
ary game theory [20]; introduced some thirty years ago by mathematical biologists as a game-
theoretical model to understand equilibrium behavior of a system of interacting entities. Their
original intention was to explain phenomena like polymorphism2 of behavior in animal societies.
These phenomena happen in spite of the fact that the individuals in these societies have neither
1For two-player games by saying that a NE persists in both the classical and quantum version of a game means
that there exists a NE consisting of quantum strategies that rewards both the players exactly the same as does the
corresponding NE in the classical version of the game.
2Polymorphism is the occurrence of different forms, stages or types in individual organisms or in organisms of
the same species.
conscience; nor rationality; nor expectations; nor even the choice between several behavioral pat-
terns which are thought to be determined genetically. Sometimes, even using the term “individual”
for members of these animals has itself been questioned.
Roughly speaking, ESS is described as a strategy having the property that if all members of
a population adapt it, no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of
natural selection. That is, if a strategy is adapted by at least 1 − ǫ0 fraction of the population
then it can resist invasion by any ǫ < ǫ0 mutant strategies. ESS is generally accepted as another
refinement of the NE concept; but the concept has been given mathematical formulations in several
contexts [23]. In the familiar context, ESS is described as a refinement on the set of symmetric
Nash equilibria which is robust against small changes (mutations) that may appear in prevalent
strategy. The robustness against mutations is referred to as evolutionary stability.
The definition of an ESS, as it was originally introduced [18] in mathematical biology, assumes
[24]:
• An infinite population of players engaged in random pair-wise contests.
• Each player being programmed to play only one strategy.
• An evolutionary pressure ensuring that the better players have better chances of survival.
It is seen that the setting of evolutionary game theory diverges away from the usual setting
of game theory in disassociating its players from the capacity to make rational decisions. The
players’ strategies are inheritable traits (phenotypes) that evolution tests for their suitability and
value in the players’ struggle for survival over the course of time. In contrast, the usual approach
in game theory assumes players both capable of making rational decisions and always interested
to maximize their payoffs.
Interestingly, in parallel to its original formulation, the ESS theory can also be interpreted such
that a player’s strategy is not a phenotype but an available option or a possible state attributable
to a player. With this interpretation the same players continue their repeated pair-wise contests.
The evolutionary pressure, however, now ensures the survival of better-performing strategies, not
players. ESS will emerge as a strategy which if played by most of the population will withstand
invasion from mutant strategies that are played by small number of the members of the population.
This view of the ESS concept can be studied also in quantum mechanical versions of evolutionary
games because it allows replacement of classical strategies with their quantum analogues. More-
over, the view permits not to associate with the players a capacity to make rational decisions;
thus retaining intact one of the important features of the ESS theory.
A question can be raised here: Where in nature do the quantum strategies exist and are
being subjected to evolutionary pressures? It seems that example of inter-molecular interactions
can be promising candidate. These interactions can both be pair-wise and taking place under
evolutionary forces. For these interactions the players’ disassociation from their capacity to act
rationally can also be granted, without further assumptions.
We now move to a question of interest that such setting is bound to raise: How game-theoretical
solution concepts, which are especially developed for the understanding of evolutionary dynamics,
adapt/shape/change themselves with players having access to quantum strategies? For the possi-
ble situation of inter-molecular interactions this question shapes itself to ask how game-theoretical
solution concepts, that are especially developed for evolutionary games, predict different equilib-
rium states of a population consisting of interacting molecules to which quantum strategies can
be associated.
The emerging field of quantum games recognizes entanglement as a resource giving new, and
often counter-intuitive dimensions to world of playing games. From the view point of ESS theory
the players’ sharing of a new resource of entanglement leads one to ask whether entanglement
can change the evolutionary stability of a symmetric NE. Of course, during this change the corre-
sponding NE remains intact in both the classical and quantum forms of the game. Evolutionary
stability is a solution concept having a relevance to a population as a whole with regards to its
capacity to withstand mutant strategies. If entanglement is found to decide evolutionary stability
then the lesson from the ESS theory is that entanglement’s effects are not confined to the pair-wise
encounters but the phenomenon can also decide the fate of the whole population, in terms of its
susceptibility to invasion from the mutant strategies that appear in small numbers.
3 An example
Though recent work in quantum games presents examples [15] of games where evolutionary sta-
bility is related to quantization of a game, a direct and explicit relationship between a measure
of entanglement and the mathematical concept of evolutionary stability is still to be investigated
even for two-player games. Earlier work [15] on this topic uses a particular quantization scheme
for matrix games suggested in the Ref. [9]. In this scheme a measure of entanglement does not
appear explicitly in players’ payoff expressions. In Eisert et al.’s scheme, on the other hand, play-
ers’ payoffs contain entanglement explicitly, which makes possible, in the present contribution, to
develope an example that shows the relationship between entanglement and evolutionary stability.
Consider a symmetric bi-matrix game given by the matrix:
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S1 S2(
(r, r) (s, t)
(t, s) (u, u)
)
(1)
Suppose Alice and Bob play the strategy S1 with probabilities p and q, respectively. The strategy
S2 is then played with probabilities (1− p) and (1− q) by Alice and Bob, respectively. We denote
Alice’s payoff by PA(p, q) when she plays p and Bob plays q. That is, Alice’s and Bob’s strategies
are identified from the numbers p, q ∈ [0, 1], without referring to S1 and S2. For the matrix (1)
the Alice’s payoff PA(p, q), for example, reads
PA(p, q) = rpq + sp(1− q) + t(1 − p)q + u(1− p)(1− q) (2)
Similarly, Bob’s payoff PB(p, q) can be written. In this symmetric game we have PA(p, q) =
PB(q, p) and, without using subscripts, P (p, q), for example, describes the payoff to p-player
against q-player. In this game the inequality
P (p∗, p∗)− P (p, p∗) > 0 (3)
says that the strategy p∗, played by both the players, is a NE.
3.1 Evolutionary stability: classical game
For symmetric contests an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is defined as follows. A strategy
p∗ is an ESS when
P (p∗, p∗) > P (p, p∗) (4)
that is, p∗ is a strict NE. If it is not the case and
P (p∗, p∗) = P (p, p∗) then p∗ is ESS if P (p∗, p) > P (p, p) (5)
showing that every ESS is a NE but not otherwise.
We consider a case when
s = t, r = u and (r − t) > 0 (6)
in the matrix (1). In this case the inequality (3) along with the definition (2) gives
P (p∗, p∗)− P (p, p∗) = (p∗ − p)(r − t)(2p∗ − 1) (7)
and the strategy p∗ = 1/2 comes out as a mixed NE. From the defining inequalities (4,5) we get
P (1/2, 1/2) − P (p, 1/2) = 0 and the first condition (4) of an ESS does not apply. The second
condition (5), then, gives
P (1/2, p)− P (p, p) = (r − t) {2p(1− p)− 1/2} (8)
which can not be strictly greater than zero given (r − t) > 0. For example, at p = 0 it becomes
a negative quantity. Therefore, for the matrix game defined by (1) and (6) the strategy p∗ = 1/2
is a symmetric NE, but it is not evolutionarily stable. Also, at this equilibrium both players get
(r + t)/2 as their payoffs.
3.2 Evolutionary stability: quantum game
Consider the same game, i.e. defined by (1) and (6), played now by the set-up proposed by Eisert
et al. [4, 5]. This scheme suggests a quantum version of the game (1) by assigning two basis vectors
|S1〉 and |S2〉 in the Hilbert space of a qubit. States of the two qubits belong to two-dimensional
Hilbert spaces HA and HB respectively. State of the game is defined by a vector residing in the
tensor-product space HA ⊗HB, spanned by the basis |S1S1〉 , |S1S2〉 , |S2S1〉 and |S2S2〉. Game’s
initial state is |ψini〉 = Jˆ |S1S1〉 where Jˆ is a unitary operator known to both the players. Alice’s
and Bob’s strategies are unitary operations UˆA and UˆB, respectively, chosen from a strategic space
S¸. The state of the game changes to UˆA⊗ UˆBJˆ |S1S1〉 after players’ actions. Finally, measurement
consists of applying reverse unitary operator Jˆ† followed by a pair of Stern-Gerlach type detectors.
Before detection the final state of the game is
∣∣ψfin〉 = Jˆ†UˆA⊗ UˆBJˆ |S1S1〉. The players’ expected
payoffs can then be written as the projections of the state
∣∣ψfin〉 onto the basis vectors of tensor-
product space HA⊗HB, weighed by the constants appearing in the game (1). For example, Alice’s
payoff reads
PA = r
∣∣〈S1S1 | ψfin〉∣∣2 + s ∣∣〈S1S2 | ψfin〉∣∣2 + t ∣∣〈S2S1 | ψfin〉∣∣2 + u ∣∣〈S2S2 | ψfin〉∣∣2 (9)
Bob’s payoff is, then, obtained by the transformation s⇄ t in Eq. (9). Eisert et al. [4, 5] allowed
players’ actions from the space S¸ of unitary operators of the form
U(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
- sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
)
(10)
where
θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2] (11)
They defined their unitary operator Jˆ = exp {iγS2 ⊗ S2/2} with γ ∈ [0, π/2] representing a
measure of the game’s entanglement. At γ = 0 the game reduces to its classical form.
After this note on Eiset et al.’s scheme, we set sA ≡ (θA, φA) and sB ≡ (θB, φB) to de-
note Alice’s and Bob’s strategies, respectively. Because the quantum game is symmetric i.e.
PA(sA, sB) = PB(sB , sA) we can write, as before, P (sA, sB) for the payoff to sA-player against
sB-player. For quantum form of the game (1,6) one finds
P (sA, sB) = (1/2)(r − t) {1 + cos θA cos θB + sin θA sin θB sin γ sin(φA + φB)}+ t (12)
The definition of a NE gives P (s∗, s∗) − P (s, s∗) > 0 where s = (θ, φ) and s∗ = (θ∗, φ∗). The
definition can be written as
{∂θP |θ∗,φ∗ (θ
∗ − θ) + ∂φP |θ∗,φ∗ (φ
∗ − φ)} ≥ 0 (13)
We search for a quantum strategy s∗ = (θ∗, φ∗) for which both ∂θP |θ∗,φ∗ , ∂φP |θ∗,φ∗ vanish
at γ = 0 and at some other value of γ which is not zero. For the payoffs (12) the strategy
s∗ = (π/2, π/4) satisfies these conditions. For this strategy the Eq. (12) gives
P (s∗, s∗)− P (s, s∗) = (1/2)(r − t) sin γ {1− sin(φ+ π/4) sin θ} (14)
At γ = 0 the strategy s∗ = (π/2, π/4), when played by both the players, is a NE which rewards
the players same as does the strategy p∗ = 1/2 in the classical version of the game i.e. (r + t)/2.
Also, then we have P (s∗, s∗) − P (s, s∗) = 0 from Eq. (14) and the ESS’s second condition (5)
applies. Use Eq. (12) to evaluate
P (s∗, s)− P (s, s) = −(r − t) cos2(θ) + (1/2)(r − t) sin γ sin θ {sin(φ+ π/4)− sin θ sin(2φ)} (15)
which at γ = 0 reduces to P (s∗, s) − P (s, s) = −(r − t) cos2(θ), which can assume negative
values. The game’s definition (6) and the ESS’s second condition (5) show that the strategy
s∗ = (π/2, π/4) is not evolutionarily stable at γ = 0.
Now consider the case when γ 6= 0 to know about the evolutionary stability of the same
quantum strategy. From (11) we have both sin θ, sin(φ + π/4) ∈ [0, 1] and the Eq. (14) indicates
that s∗ = (π/2, π/4) remains a NE for all γ ∈ [0, π/2]. The product sin(φ + π/4) sin θ attains a
value of 1 only at s∗ = (π/2, π/4) and remains less than 1 otherwise. The Eq. (14) shows that
for γ 6= 0 the strategy s∗ = (π/2, π/4) becomes a strict NE for which the ESS’s first condition
(4) applies. Therefore, for the game defined in (6) the strategy s∗ = (π/2, π/4) is evolutionarily
stable for a non-zero measure of entanglement γ.
4 Discussion
The above example shows explicitly how presence of entanglement leads to evolutionary stability of
a strategy. It is of interest for three apparent reasons. Firstly, the game-theoretical concept of evo-
lutionary stability has very rich literature in game theory, mathematical biology and evolutionary
economics [22, 21]. Secondly, the result that the game-theoretical concept of evolutionary stability
can be discussed in relation to entanglement opens a new role for this phenomenon. It is a role
where entanglement decides whether a population of interacting entities can withstand invasion
from mutant strategies appearing in small numbers. Thirdly, this extended role for entanglement
can possibly be helpful to better understand entanglement itself.
A possible criticism of studying evolutionary stability in quantum games may come from the
following view point. Being a game-theoretical solution concept, originally developed to under-
stand problems in population biology, how can the concept be taken out of its context of population
biology and discussed in quantum games? Evolutionary stability was indeed originally introduced
within population biology but the concept can also be given an interpretation in term of two-player
game that is infinitely repeated. Secondly, the population setting that evolutionary stability as-
sumes does not come only from discussion of the problems of population biology. Even the concept
of NE, as it was originally developed by John Nash, assumed a population of players. In his un-
published thesis he wrote ‘it is unnecessary to assume that the participants have...... the ability
to go through any complex reasoning process. But the participants are supposed to accumulate
empirical information on the various pure strategies at their disposal.......We assume that there is
a population .......of participants......and that there is a stable average frequency with which a pure
strategy is employed by the “average member” of the appropriate population’[20, 16]. Evolutionary
stability, as a game-theoretical concept, also has roots in efforts to get the game theory rid of its
usual approach devoting itself to analyzing games among hyper-rational players always ready and
engaged in selfish interests to increase their payoffs. The lesson evolutionary stability teaches is
that playing games can be disassociated from players’ capacity to make rational decisions. Such
disassociation seems equally fruitful to possible situations where quantum games are being played
in nature; because associating rationality to quantum interacting entities is of even much more
remote possibility then bacteria and viruses whose behavior evolutionary game theory explains.
An interesting approach [25] characterizes ESSs in terms of extremal states of a function known
as evolutionary entropy defined by
E = −
∑
i
µi logµi
where µi represents the relative contribution of the ith strategy to the total payoff. A possible
extension of the present approach may be the case when entanglement decides extremal states
of evolutionary entropy. Extension on similar lines can be proposed for another quantity which
Bomze called relative negentropy [24] and it is optimized during the course of evolution.
In the Section (3.2) entanglement gives evolutionary stability to a symmetric NE by making it
a strict NE as well. Thus evolutionary stability is achieved by only using the ESS’s first condition.
Perhaps a more interesting example is when entanglement gives evolutionary stability via the
ESS’s second condition. That is, entanglement makes P (s∗, s) strictly greater than P (s, s) when
P (s∗, s∗) and P (s, s∗) are equal.
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